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Abstract:  
We investigate whether information possessed by rank-and-file employees is incorporated in top 
managers’ expectations and decisions. Using employees’ predictions of their company’s business 
outlook from Glassdoor.com to measure the employees’ information set, and using management 
earnings forecasts to measure management expectations, we show that management expectations 
incorporate employees’ information only partially. This intrafirm information asymmetry is 
lower when top managers are more experienced and internally engaged and when employees are 
more satisfied with senior management, firm culture, and their compensation; and higher in 
companies that are more decentralized, have internal control weakness, and poorly incentivize 
their employees. Further analyses suggest that our results are not driven by managers’ 
strategically choosing not to use employees’ information in their forecasts. Finally, we document 
that firms with large discrepancies between management forecasts and employee outlook have 
poorer future performance and a higher likelihood of CEO turnover. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Financial accounting generally assumes that top managers make disclosure decisions 
based on all information available in the firm. In contrast, managerial accounting recognizes 
information asymmetry—defined as differences in knowledge between top managers and 
employees—as one of two key “primitives” that drive organizational design (Hofmann and Van 
Lent 2015). Though theoretically important, intrafirm information asymmetry has been difficult 
to measure empirically. This has prevented researchers from addressing basic questions about its 
existence and significance and slowed their progress toward understanding its determinants and 
consequences. 
The primary challenge in measuring this information asymmetry is that employees’ 
information is generally unobservable to researchers. We overcome this challenge by exploiting 
the database from the popular job site Glassdoor.com. On this site, company employees can 
choose from three options to predict company performance six months into the future: “get 
better,” “stay the same,” or “get worse” (“employee outlook,” henceforth). We code these 
predictions +1, 0, and -1, respectively, and average them across all current employees to obtain a 
measure of the employees’ information set. Our estimate of intrafirm information asymmetry is 
the slope coefficient in a regression of management forecast errors on employee outlook issued 
within 30 days prior to the issuance of the management forecast.1 If management has access to 
employees’ information, then its forecasts will fully incorporate the information embedded in 
employee outlook, and the slope coefficient on employee outlook will be zero. 
 Our sample consists of 153,227 individual employee predictions and 11,686 annual 
management forecasts for 994 unique firms from May 2012 to September 2017. Controlling for 
                                                 
1 Our results throughout the paper are robust if we use a 60-day or 90-day instead of 30-day window. 
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other determinants of management forecast error, we find a positive and significant coefficient 
on Outlook, suggesting that higher (lower) employee outlook is associated with more pessimistic 
(optimistic) management forecasts. This finding is consistent with top management not 
possessing all the information held by employees. In terms of economic significance, one 
standard deviation increase in Outlook increases the management forecast error by 0.05 
percentage points, which is equivalent to 51% of our sample mean forecast error.  
We next explore whether the information asymmetry between management and 
employees is alleviated by CEO’s experience and internal engagement, employees’ satisfaction, 
and organizational factors such as centralized decision making, better internal control, and use of 
stock options to incentivize employees. 
First, we posit that more experienced and internally focused CEOs are generally more 
knowledgeable about firm operations and more engaged with company employees, resulting in 
lower information asymmetry. We define experienced CEOs as company founders or CEOs who 
are later in their tenure, and define internally focused CEOs as ones who attend fewer investor 
conferences. Consistently, we find that both of these CEO attributes are associated with lower 
information asymmetry. This is a novel finding. Unlike prior research, which suggests that 
longer tenure increases CEO entrenchment, our results show that longer tenure increases CEOs’ 
ability to collect and process internal information. And while existing studies document that 
externally oriented CEOs help improve firm-investor relations (Green et al. 2014), we find that 
these CEOs are less informed about their companies’ internal affairs.  
Second, we posit that higher employee satisfaction increases employees’ motivation and 
trust in management, and that this, in turn, makes employees more willing to communicate 
information to superiors—resulting in lower information asymmetry. Using Glassdoor.com-
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solicited employees’ ratings of senior management, firm culture and values, and employee 
compensation and benefits as measures of satisfaction, we find that the association between 
forecast error and outlook is lower when employees are more satisfied. This is consistent with 
more satisfied employees broadening the information set used for managerial decisions, and 
extends prior work on the relation between employee satisfaction and company performance 
(Edmans 2011).  
Third, drawing on prior work in managerial accounting (Feng et al. 2009; Li et al. 2014; 
Hofmann and Lent 2015), we predict that information asymmetry is greater in more 
decentralized firms (because information aggregation is more challenging in these firms), firms 
with less effective internal control systems (because weaker controls exacerbate information-
processing errors and delays), and firms with less employee stock options (because employees in 
these firms have less incentive to communicate private information to their superiors). Our 
results are consistent with these predictions, and provide systematic empirical evidence in 
support of theoretical research that models the effect of these firm factors on internal information 
communication. 
An alternative explanation for the predictive value of employee outlook with respect to 
management forecast errors is that management has access to the employees’ information but 
chooses not to use it. We present two sets of results that are inconsistent with this explanation. 
First, we show that top managers do not incorporate positive outlook even when they have strong 
economic incentives to do so—specifically, in firms with high financial distress, external 
financing needs, high product market competition, and high insider selling. Second, we show 
that top managers’ own purchases, which are highly likely to be information-driven, are 
unrelated to employee outlook.  
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Finally, we test the consequences of the information asymmetry between top 
management and employees. When top managers do not acquire and use employees’ information 
in operational and investment decisions, firm performance is likely to suffer. We regard the 
manager-employee expectation gap as large when management forecast error is in the most 
optimistic (pessimistic) quintile and employee outlook is in the most pessimistic (optimistic) 
quintile in any of the past three years. We find that, relative to other firms, firms with large 
manager-employee expectation gaps experience a decline in current year’s ROA (Tobin’s Q) that 
is equivalent to 16 (10) percent of sample mean. In addition, the likelihood of CEO turnover in 
these firms increases by 3.7 percentage points, representing an increase of 48 percent from the 
average turnover rate for firms without large expectation gaps. 
We extend managerial accounting research both by quantifying the information 
asymmetry between top management and company employees and by documenting its 
determinants and consequences. A nascent literature studies intrafirm information asymmetry 
among the individuals atop the corporate hierarchy. This includes Li et al. (2014) and Ke et al. 
(2018), who examine information asymmetry within top management teams, and Chen et al. 
(2018), who consider information asymmetry between top management and divisional managers. 
However, information asymmetries are not limited to a company’s uppermost levels. In today’s 
large, multilayered organizations, information frictions prevent employees at all levels from 
sharing information with their superiors. Our measure of information asymmetry, constructed 
from social media disclosures by employees at all levels, captures this pervasiveness.  
Our study also contributes to the disclosure literature. Our finding that managers 
inefficiently use available information from employees extends prior work on management 
forecast inefficiency, which focused on managers’ use of existing information from financial 
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reports (e.g., Gong et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2011). Additionally, our finding that large manager-
employee expectation gaps incrementally predict poor company performance and adverse CEO 
career outcomes is consistent with prior results linking forecast inaccuracy to poor performance 
and CEO turnover (Lee et al. 2012; Goodman et al. 2014). Furthermore, we extend this line of 
literature by identifying information asymmetry between company employees and top 
management as a culprit of forecast inaccuracy. Our results therefore have distinct implications 
for researchers and managers alike.  
Our study fundamentally differs from other studies that also use Glassdoor.com data 
(e.g., Hales et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2018; Sheng 2018). While previous papers use Glassdoor 
data to study how employees’ social media disclosures reveal new information in capital 
markets, we use it to study the flow of information within the firm—from company rank-and-file 
employees to top management. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the literature and 
develop our hypotheses. In Section III, we discuss our sample and provide descriptive statistics. 
In Section IV, we present the results of our analyses. We conclude in Section V. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Related Literature 
Organizational theories have long recognized that knowledge relevant to decision making 
is spread among employees across different hierarchies within a firm (Aghion and Tirole 1997). 
A key objective of organizational design is to ensure that information available throughout the 
organization is collected and used in centralized decision making (Baiman et al. 1995; Brickley 
et al. 2009). 
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Motivated by the economic and organizational theories, prior research identifies the 
factors that influence internal information acquisitions and communications. A number of studies 
suggest that effective management controls, including SOX 404 internal controls, enterprise 
systems, and risk-based forecasting and planning processes, facilitate information acquisition and 
processing and hence improve management forecast accuracy (Feng et al. 2009; Dorantes et al. 
2013; Ittner and Michels 2017). These studies focus on firm general information environment 
and do not touch upon the two distinct channels through which internal information quality can 
be improved, i.e., information production and information sharing. 
Looking beyond control systems, recent research examines how “human factors” affect 
internal information environment. For example, Ke et al. (2018) propose that social connections 
within top management teams foster teamwork and information sharing, and document that 
social connections are associated with higher management forecast accuracy. Garrett et al. 
(2014) find that employees’ trust in management is associated with higher financial reporting 
quality, consistent with trust improving information production and sharing. While both studies 
theorize that greater information sharing is one possible mechanism for their observed results, 
they do not provide empirical evidence on the mechanism because they lack direct measures that 
assess the extent of information sharing.  
In a related study, Chen et al. (2018) focuses exclusively on information sharing. They 
develop a direct measure of information asymmetry between top and divisional managers using 
the difference in their respective trading profits on their own company’s stock and find that their 
measure is associated with various aspects of management forecast quality and error-driven 
accounting restatements.  
7 
 
The above discussion shows that none of the existing studies have provided direct 
evidence on the information asymmetry between top managers and rank-and-file employees. We 
fill this void by establishing a direct measure of such information asymmetry using employee 
predictions of company performance from Glassdoor.com to proxy for employee information.  
Hypothesis Development 
Information Asymmetry between Top Management and Rank-and-file Employees 
Company employees acquire valuable information through interactions with customers, 
suppliers, and fellow employees. However, because of non-trivial information costs and agency 
costs, some of this information cannot be transmitted to top management. Top managers may 
lack the experience or motivation to collect information from rank-and-file employees, and 
employees may withhold or distort information due to distrust in management, career concerns, 
or other motives (Prendergast 1993; Garrett et al. 2014). Organizational factors such as a 
decentralized organizational structure and ineffective internal information systems could also 
limit information transmission within a firm.  
It is possible that employees possess important information that is unknown to top 
managers but employee predictions of company performance on Glassdoor do not capture this 
information. There are at least two reasons for this. First, it is possible that lower-level 
employees base their predictions mostly on forecasts by upper management and not their own 
private information. Second, given that each employee’s job composes only a small piece of the 
company’s business, an employee may frame the forecasting problem too narrowly and 
overemphasize information about her part of the company, resulting in less informative 
predictions. Therefore, whether employee outlook can capture valuable information that is only 
available in the bottom corporate hierarchies is an empirical question. 
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Determinants of Internal Information Asymmetry                               
As suggested by prior research, individuals have limited capability to gather, absorb, and 
process information (Sah and Stigliz 1986). Accordingly, we identify attributes that are likely to 
influence the CEO’s ability to assimilate and aggregate information across corporate hierarchies. 
Specifically, we use founder status and tenure to measure CEO experience with the firm, and 
whether the CEO is internally or externally focused to measure CEO involvement in firm 
operations. Founder CEOs generally possess in-depth organizational knowledge due to their 
long-term ownership of, and reputational and emotional ties to, the company (Demsetz and Lehn 
1985). Thus, firms with founder CEOs are likely to have lower manager-employee expectation 
gaps. Similarly, CEO tenure plays a role in a CEO’s ability to extract employee-level 
information, because relationship building with firm employees takes time (Li et al. 2014). 
Therefore, CEOs with longer tenure are likely to be more familiar with the firm’s business and 
their subordinates, leading to lower information asymmetry. Additionally, internally focused 
CEOs—CEOs who devote more time to interactions with employees and less time to external 
affairs—are likely to obtain more information within the firm, resulting in lower information 
asymmetry. 
We next examine how employee satisfaction—as reflected in Glassdoor.com employee 
assessments of senior management, culture and values, compensation and benefits, and career 
opportunities—affects the information asymmetry between management and employees. 
Employee satisfaction should facilitate information sharing, because employees who are more 
satisfied with their management and their company are more willing to reveal private 
information to management; those who are less satisfied are more likely to postpone delivering 
bad news, to avoid being perceived as poor performers. Therefore, we predict that the manager-
employee expectation gap decreases with employee satisfaction. 
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Finally, we examine how firm characteristics related to organizational structure, internal 
controls, and employee incentive structures affect the information asymmetry between 
management and employees. In more decentralized firms, top management is less likely to have 
all the information generated from the bottom, as information transfer and aggregation are more 
challenging (Garrett et al. 2014). Ineffective internal controls increase information processing 
errors and reduce the timeliness of information transfers, leading to greater information 
asymmetry (Feng et al. 2009). In addition, employee stock options that link employee 
compensation with firm performance can be an effective mechanism to promote information 
sharing, because employees who receive options have an additional incentive to boost firm 
performance and hence are more willing to reveal their private information.   
Consequences of Internal Information Asymmetry     
Decision theory has established that the quality of the information on which decisions are 
based affects decision quality and outcomes (Gallemore and Labor 2015). Firms recognize that 
information held by their employees is critical to their operational and investment decisions. 
Corporations such as Ford Motor Company, Best Buy, and Hewlett-Packard go so far as to 
operate internal prediction markets, where employee participants trade virtual securities on event 
outcomes, in order to extract employees’ information on product demand, project completion, 
R&D, and other areas (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004; Dvorak 2008; Cowgill and Zitzewitz 2015). 
Failure to incorporate such information from employees can lead to inefficient managerial 
decisions. Therefore, we predict that greater information asymmetry between management and 
employees leads to lower firm performance in the future.   
We also examine whether managers’ failure to incorporate employee information affects 
CEO career outcome. If a failure to incorporate employee information leads to poor managerial 
decisions and lower firm performance, then the board of directors should punish the managers 
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for this, increasing the likelihood of CEO turnover. This prediction is consistent with Lee et al. 
(2012). They suggest that management forecast accuracy signals managers’ ability to anticipate 
and respond to future events, and find that CEO turnover is positively associated with absolute 
value of management forecast errors when firm performance is poor. More importantly, our 
prediction identifies a specific source of management forecast inefficiency: the failure to 
incorporate employee information.  
 
III. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Glassdoor Data and Sample Selection 
Launched in 2008, Glassdoor.com is a large website where current and former employees 
voluntarily, directly, and anonymously review companies and their management. Each company 
review contains various five-point scale ratings: an overall rating on the company as well as 
optional ratings on senior management, career opportunities, compensation and benefits, 
work/life balance, and culture and values.2 Importantly, since May 2012, employees have been 
asked to assess their companies’ six-month business outlook by choosing one of three options: 
“get better,” “stay the same,” or “get worse.” Our initial data from Glassdoor include more than 
1 million employee outlook reviews for 6,790 public firms from May 2012 to September 2017. 
After merging the data with Compustat universe using both ticker symbols and company names, 
we have 928,725 outlook reviews (506,691 of which are from current employees) for 5,200 
unique firms. 
We collect management forecasts of annual earnings issued during years 2012–2017 
from the I/B/E/S guidance database. We retain management earnings forecasts issued before and 
                                                 
2 The review also specifies whether the employee approves the CEO, and whether she recommends the company to 
a friend. 
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on the fiscal year end of the forecasting year, and for which we can find actual earnings per share 
information, resulting in a total of 24,609 forecasts. For each forecast, we identify business 
outlook provided by current employees within 30 days prior to the forecast issuance, and find 
matched outlook for 11,937 management earnings forecasts. Lastly, requiring sufficient 
Compustat control variables, stock return information from CRSP, and analyst following 
information from I/B/E/S, our final sample consists of 11,686 annual management forecasts from 
3,520 firm-years.  
Research Design 
We examine the expectation gap between top management and rank-and-file employees 
by estimating the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model:  
MFEi,t+1  =   β0 + β1Outlooki,t+1 + β Controlsi,t + ∑Industry FE + ∑Time FE + εi,t+1 
                                                                                                                   (1)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
where MFE is management forecast error, measured as actual earnings per share for year t+1 
minus management earnings forecast for year t+1, scaled by the closing price at the end of fiscal 
year t. If management issues a range forecast, we use the midpoint of the range. Outlook is the 
average value of the outlook assessments provided by current employees within 30 days prior to 
the issuance date of the management forecast. 
Controls represent a vector of variables that could be correlated with both MFE and 
Outlook. We control for firm characteristics, such as size (Size), market-to-book ratio (MTB), and 
leverage (LEV), and for performance-related variables, including current return on assets (ROA), 
sales growth (SG), incidence of loss (Loss), level of accruals (TACC), and stock returns (RET). 
We include earnings volatility (STDROA) and return volatility (STDRET) to control for 
uncertainty (Rogers and Stocken 2005). We control for litigation risk (LitiRisk) and analyst 
coverage (LogNUMA), as greater litigation risk may deter managers from issuing optimistic 
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forecasts, and greater analyst coverage brings more public scrutiny on management disclosure 
(e.g., Francis et al. 1994; Lang and Lundholm 1996). Finally, we control for forecast horizon 
(Horizon), because longer horizon forecasts are harder to forecast and more likely to be 
optimistic. We provide detailed definitions of all the variables in the Appendix. To mitigate the 
influences of outliers in the data, we winsorize the top and bottom one-percentiles of all 
continuous variables except Outlook.3 We cluster standard errors at the firm and year levels to 
address cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. 2010) and include both year and 
industry fixed effects in our regressions. 
 If managers do not have access to employees’ information, they will underreact to such 
information in forecasting earnings, leading to a positive coefficient on Outlook.4 
After investigating the basic relation between management forecast errors and employee 
outlook, we further examine how various CEO-, employee-, and firm-related factors affect the 
expectation gap between management and employees. Specifically, we identify the effect of each 
factor by estimating the following regression model:   
MFEi,t+1  =   β0 + β1Outlooki,t + β2Factori,t + β3Outlooki,t * Factori,t +β4Controlsi,t + 
∑Industry FE + ∑Time FE + εi,t+1                                              (2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Where Factor represents a proxy for a CEO-, employee-, or firm-related factor (to be discussed 
in detail in Section IV). Our variable of interest is Outlook * Factor. A positive (negative) 
coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the factor exacerbates (ameliorates) the 
information asymmetry.   
 
                                                 
3 We do not winsorize outlook because individual outlook is coded as -1, 0, and 0 and not subject to outlier and error 
problems.  
4 Based on our definition of management forecast error, a positive error indicates management pessimism 
(optimism). 
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 IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our sample data. The mean and median values of 
MFE are 0.0010 and 0.0015, respectively. These positive values indicate that, on average, 
management forecasts are pessimistic. This is consistent with a trend toward increasingly 
pessimistic range earnings forecasts documented in Ciconte et al. (2014). The mean (median) 
value of Outlook is 0.31 (0.33), indicating that, on average, employees expect firm performance 
to improve. Outlook varies substantially, increasing from 0.0 in the first quartile to 0.8 in the 
third quartile.  
The mean (median) market capitalization in our sample is 5.8 (5.7) billion, with a market-
to-book ratio of 4.7 (3.1). Our sample firms are profitable, with an average return on assets of 
6.2%, sales growth of 7.5%, and stock returns of 16.8%. Both the mean and median values of 
horizon are 0.58, which is equivalent to 211 days between the management earnings forecast 
issuance date and forecasting period end. Finally, the mean (median) value of the number of 
analyst following is 13(14). 
Predicting Management Forecast Errors Using Employee Outlook 
Table 2 reports the results on the relation between management forecast errors and 
employee outlook. We present three specifications: (1) control variables excluded, (2) control 
variables included, and (3) replacing the midpoint with the upper value of the range forecast to 
compute management forecast error. We include specification (3) because Ciconte et al. (2014) 
suggest that the upper bound of range forecasts is closer to managers’ true expectations than the 
midpoint in recent years. The coefficient estimates on Outlook are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all specifications, consistent with management’s underreaction to 
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the information embedded in employee outlook. In terms of economic significance, based on 
specification (2), a one-standard-deviation increase in Outlook is associated with an increase of 
MFE by 0.0005, which is about 51 percent of sample mean MFE.5  
Turning to control variables, we find a negative and significant coefficient on ROA, 
suggesting that managers over-extrapolate past performance in forecasting future earnings. The 
coefficient on TACC is negative and significant, consistent with a prior finding that managers 
overreact to accounting accruals (Gong et al. 2009). We also find that firms with volatile 
earnings have less optimistic forecasts, while firms with volatile stock returns have more 
optimistic forecasts. Finally, the coefficient on Horizon is negative and significant, consistent 
with our expectation that management forecast optimism increases with forecast horizon.   
Cross-sectional Analysis: CEO Attributes 
In this subsection, we identify CEO attributes that are likely to be associated with the 
expectation gap between management and employees. Managers who are more experienced with 
the firm or more engaged in firm operations should have greater organizational knowledge and 
should hence acquire more employee-level information. Therefore, we expect a weaker 
association between management forecast error and employee outlook when firm CEOs are more 
experienced or engaged with the firm. We use CEO founder status and tenure to measure CEO 
experience, and whether the CEO is internally or externally oriented to measure CEO 
engagement. Specifically, we construct three indicator variables: CEO_Founder is equal to one if 
the CEO is a founder of the company, and zero otherwise; CEO_Tenure is equal to one if the 
number of years the CEO has worked for the company is above our sample median, and zero 
otherwise; and  ExternalOriented_CEO is equal to one if the number of investor conferences the 
                                                 
5 As a reference, the economic effect of outlook is comparable to that of accruals as examined in Gong et al. (2009) 
and is about half the effect of earnings volatility, a known key determinant of management forecast error.  
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CEO attends in a year is above our sample median, and zero otherwise. Panel A of Table 3 
describes the summary statistics of the three proxies. We find that 18.5% of CEOs in our sample 
are founders, the mean (median) tenure of CEOs is 7.4 (5.3) years, and CEOs attend 6.9 
conferences per year on average. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports results on how the manager-employee expectation gap varies 
with the three CEO attributes. In column (1), the coefficient on Outlook*CEO_Founder is 
negative and significant (-0.0029, t=2.01), consistent with our prediction that founder CEOs 
gather more employee information and incorporate it in their earnings forecasts. In Column (2), 
the coefficient on Outlook*CEO_Tenure is also negative and significant, suggesting that CEOs 
with longer tenure are likely to have more employee information. In Column (3), 
Outlook*ExternalOriented_CEO loads significantly positive, implying that CEOs who spend 
more time on outside communications have less internal knowledge and therefore incorporate 
less employee information in earnings forecasts.  
Cross-sectional Analysis: Employee Satisfaction 
We next examine how employee satisfaction affects the expectation gap between 
management and employees. Employees who are more satisfied with their management and firm 
should be more willing to reveal and communicate their private information to management. 
Therefore, we predict that the manager-employee expectation gap decreases with employee 
satisfaction. We examine various aspects of employee satisfaction available from Glassdoor, 
including employee assessments of senior management; culture and values; compensation and 
benefits; and career opportunities.     
Table 4 reports our empirical results. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of 
employee satisfaction scores that are measured based on a five-point scale, with “most satisfied” 
16 
 
being five and “least satisfied” being one. The average score ranges from 2.97 for senior 
management to 3.35 for compensation and benefits. The median score ranges from 3.00 for 
senior management to 3.42 for culture and values. The descriptive statistics indicate that, on 
average, employees are neutral towards their management and company.  
Panel B presents the regression results. Each proxy for a specific aspect of employee 
satisfaction is measured as an indicator variable equal to one if the average value of the 
employee assessments is above the sample median. We find that the interaction terms on 
employee satisfaction proxies and outlook are negative and significant in Columns (1) to (3), 
suggesting that the expectation gap is lower when employees have higher assessments of senior 
management; culture and values; and compensation and benefits. The coefficient on the 
interaction term in Column (4) is negative but insignificant. In Column (5), we conduct principal 
component analysis to construct an overall satisfaction score (SatisfFactor) based on all four 
aspects of employee satisfaction, and find that the interaction term between SatisfFactor and 
Outlook loads negatively and significantly (-0.0006, t = 2.49). The overall results are consistent 
with our prediction that employee satisfaction encourages information sharing by employees and 
reduces the expectation gap between them and management.   
Cross-sectional Analysis: Firm Characteristics 
Finally, we expect that the manager-employee expectation gaps are greater for 
decentralized firms and firms with internal control weakness, and lower for firms with more 
employee stock options. To measure decentralization, we first conduct principal component 
analysis based on the number of business segments, the number of geographic segments, and the 
number of employees, and obtain the first factor.6 We construct Decentralization as an indicator 
                                                 
6 Principal component analysis reveals that a single factor adequately explains the variation in these three variables. 
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variable equal to one if this factor is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
IC_Weakness is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm discloses an internal weakness in the 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise; and EmpStockOption is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
non-executive employee stock option is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.  
Table 5 reports our results. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics on firm 
characteristics. Firms in our sample on average have 2.6 business segments, 3.4 geographic 
segments, 35,766 employees, and non-executive stock options that account for 3.6% of the 
number of shares outstanding. Also, 3.6% of our sample firms have internal control weakness. 
Panel B reports the regression results. In Column (1), the coefficient on the interaction term 
between Outlook and Decentralization is positive and significant, consistent with our prediction 
that the information gap is greater in more decentralized firms. In Column (2), the interaction 
term between Outlook and IC_Weakness loads significantly positive, indicating that firms with 
ineffective internal controls have greater information gaps between management and employees. 
In Column (3), the interaction term between EmpStockOption and Outlook loads significantly 
negative, suggesting that the use of employee stock options facilitates employee information 
sharing and hence results in a lower information gap.  
Unintentional vs. Intentional Forecasting Behavior  
Managerial Incentive Analysis 
 We attribute the positive association between management forecast error and employee 
outlook to managers’ lacking important information held by rank-and-file employees. However, 
this positive association could also arise if managers do possess the information from rank-and-
file employees but choose not to incorporate it in their earnings forecast for strategic reasons. We 
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address this alternative explanation by examining whether managers use outlook information in 
cases where they have strong incentives to do so.  
Prior research identifies various incentives that motivate managers to bias their earnings 
forecasts, including financial distress, external financing, product market competition, and 
insider trading. Financial distress drives managers to boost market expectations with optimistic 
forecasts due to career concerns (Frost 1997; Koch 2002). External financing motivates 
managers to issue optimistic forecasts to facilitate security issuance and increase cash proceeds 
(Frankel et al. 1995; Lang and Lundholm 2000). High industry competition also encourages 
managers to disclose good news in their forecasts, to signal managers’ ability. Finally, managers 
are more likely to disclose good news before selling firm stocks, because this boosts insider-
trading profitability (Noe 1999; Aboody and Kasznik 2000).  
We examine the relation between management forecast error and positive employee 
outlook in subsamples of high financial distress, high external financing, high industry 
competition (measured by low market concentration), and high insider selling. We expect that 
managers have incentives to incorporate good news from employees in all four subsamples. 
Columns (1)–(4) of Table 6 report the results. Consistently, we find that the coefficients on 
Outlook are positive and significant across all four columns, indicating that managers do not 
fully incorporate the information in positive employee outlook in their earnings forecasts even 
when they have strong incentives to do so. The results suggest that managers’ underreaction to 
employee outlook is most likely caused by their lack of awareness of it and not by their 
intentionally excluding it from earnings forecasts.   
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Insider Trading Analysis 
 We also examine whether managers’ trades of their own companies’ stocks are associated 
with employee outlook. Insider trades should capture managers’ private information sets and be 
free or nearly free of intentional bias. Therefore, we infer that managers do not have employee 
information if their trades are not associated with employee outlook. We focus on insider 
purchases only, because purchases are more likely to be information-driven, whereas sales can 
also be driven by diversification or liquidity needs. 
 Table 7 reports the results on the relation between insider purchases and employee 
outlook. In Column (1), Purchase_Indicator is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO or 
CFO makes any open market purchases in the 30 days following the date of issuance of the 
management forecast.7 In Columns (2) and (3), Purchase_Quantity is the abnormal number of 
shares purchased by the CEO and CFO, measured as the difference between shares purchased in 
the 30 days after the forecast issuance date and shares purchased in the 90 days before the 
forecast issuance date, scaled by the number shares outstanding. We use abnormal purchases to 
control for firm-specific factors that impact insider trading. In Column (2), we code 
Purchase_Quantity as zero for observations with no trading activities. In Column (3), we 
exclude observations with no trading activities. The control variables in all three columns are the 
same as in Table 2. In all three columns, insider purchases are not associated with employee 
outlook, providing further evidence that managers do not possess the information embedded in 
employee outlook.8  
                                                 
7 Because employee outlook is the average outlook issued within 30 days prior to the management forecast date, the 
CEO and CFO trades in our tests are measured after employees post their outlook predictions on Glassdoor.  
8 The coefficients on total accruals are negative and significant, consistent with the prior finding that managers 
understand the implication of accruals and trade accordingly (Beneish and Vargus 2002). The significant result on 
accruals also suggests that the insignificant coefficients on Outlook are unlikely to have been caused by a lack of 
statistical power.   
20 
 
Consequences of Manager-Employee Expectation Gap  
Future Performance Analysis 
Information held by firm employees is critical to operational and investment decisions. 
Failure to incorporate valuable employee information can lead to inefficient managerial 
decisions and lower future performance. Therefore, we expect that firms with larger information 
asymmetry between management and employees have lower performance in the future. 
We measure firm performance using both accounting performance (ROA) and market 
valuation (TobinQ). To proxy for the manager-employee expectation gap, we construct an 
indicator variable (LargeGap) equal to one if management forecast error is in the most optimistic 
(pessimistic) quintile and employee outlook is in the most pessimistic (optimistic) quintile in any 
of the previous three years, and zero otherwise. We regress firm future performance on 
LargeGap. We control for various firm characteristics, including size, leverage, return on assets, 
sales growth, tangible assets, R&D, return volatility, and institutional ownership. We control for 
management forecast accuracy (AbsMFE), as Goodman et al. (2014) suggest that forecast 
accuracy is associated with investment efficiency. We control for employee satisfaction, because 
Edmans (2011) suggests that employee satisfaction improves firm performance. Finally, we 
control for employee outlook in order to separate the predictive value of outlook on future 
performance from the economic consequence of the manager-employee expectation gap. For 
consistency with the definition of LargeGap, we use the average value from the past three years 
for all control variables. 
Table 8 reports our results. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the sample used for 
future performance analysis. Firms in this sample have a mean ROA of 0.05 and Tobin’s Q of 
2.26. About 16% have a large manager-employee expectation gap in the past three years.  
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Panel B reports regression results. We find that the coefficient on LargeGap is negative 
and significant when either ROA or TobinQ is used as the dependent variable and whether or not 
Outlook is included in the regression. These results are consistent with our prediction that the 
manager-employee expectation gap is associated with poorer future accounting performance and 
firm valuations. In terms of economic magnitude, as we move from firms without a large gap to 
firms with a large gap, we find that ROA (TobinQ) decreases by 0.8% (0.231), equivalent to 16% 
(10%) of the sample mean. With respect to control variables, we find that management forecast 
accuracy and employee overall satisfaction are positively associated with future performance, as 
suggested in prior studies (Goodman et al 2014; Edmans 2011). Outlook is also positively 
associated with future performance, consistent with Hales et al. (2018) and Huang et al. (2018).   
CEO Turnover Analysis 
We also examine whether failure to incorporate employee information affects CEO 
career outcome. If CEOs’ ability to acquire and incorporate employee information in managerial 
decisions is critical to firm success, then failure to incorporate such information should increase 
the likelihood of CEO turnover. Lee et al. (2012) suggest that management forecast accuracy 
signals managers’ ability to anticipate and respond to future events, and find that CEO turnover 
is positively associated with the absolute value of management forecast errors when firm 
performance is poor. We examine whether a specific source of management forecast 
inefficiency—the failure to incorporate employee information—has an incremental effect on 
CEO turnover beyond the effect documented in Lee et al. (2012).  
Following Lee et al. (2012), we control for a list of determinants of CEO turnover, 
including firm accounting and stock performance; size; earnings volatility and return volatility; 
institutional ownership; and CEO age and power. In addition, we control for forecast accuracy, 
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to distinguish our effect from that of forecast accuracy. Finally, we control for employee 
satisfaction and employee outlook for the same reason as in our future performance analysis. To 
be consistent with the definition of LargeGap, we use the average value from the past three years 
for all control variables. 
Table 9 reports our results on the relation between the manager-employee expectation 
gap and CEO turnover. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of all variables used in the 
regression. The average CEO turnover rate is 0.10, and about 16% of the firms have a large 
manager-employee expectation gap in the past three years. The average age of the CEOs is 56, 
and the average tenure is 7.4 years. Fifty-six percent of the CEOs also serve as the chairman of 
the board. 
Panel B reports logit regression results. We find that the coefficient on LargeGap remains 
positive and significant in regressions that include CEO characteristics, employee overall 
satisfaction, and Outlook, respectively. These results suggest that a larger manager-employee 
expectation gap is associated with higher likelihood of future CEO turnover. In terms of 
economic magnitude, relative to firms without large manager-employer expectation gaps, the 
likelihood of CEO turnover in firms with large manager-employee expectation gaps is higher by 
3.7 percentage points, equivalent to a 48 percent increase. Turning to control variables, 
consistent with our expectations, we find that future CEO turnover is negatively associated with 
past firm performance (measured by return on equity (ROE) and market-adjusted returns 
(CAR)), positively associated with CEO age and tenure, and negatively associated with CEO 
ownership. We also find that the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases with employee 
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satisfaction in the past three years. Finally, we do not find a significant relation between CEO 
turnover and management forecast accuracy in our sample.9 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we use employees’ predictions of firm business outlook from 
Glassdoor.com and management earnings forecasts to examine the existence, determinants, and 
consequences of information asymmetry between rank-and-file employees and top managers. 
We find that management earnings expectations do not fully incorporate employees’ 
information. We further observe that the information asymmetry between management and 
employees is alleviated by CEO’s experience and internal engagement, employees’ satisfaction, 
and organizational factors such as centralized decision making, better internal control, and use of 
stock options to incentivize employees. Finally, we document that firms with larger manager-
employee expectation gaps have lower future performance and higher CEO turnover. 
Our study takes an important step toward understanding intrafirm information 
asymmetry, and has important implications for both academics and practitioners. Organizational 
theory has long recognized that information is widely dispersed among firm employees. 
Extensive research has identified organizational designs that promote the use of appropriate 
organizational knowledge in decision-making. The large sample evidence from recent years in 
our study suggests that despite the substantial efforts made by organizational designers, 
significant information asymmetry still exists between management and employees within 
organizations, and that this asymmetry has significant negative consequences. The fact that the 
                                                 
9 Our sample period of 2012-2017 is different from the sample period of 1996 and 2006 in Lee et al. (2012). In 
addition, we do not examine CEO turnover conditional on poor firm performance. These differences may explain 
why we do not find significant relation between management forecast accuracy and CEO turnover in our test.  
24 
 
business outlook information disclosed by employees through social media is coarse and 
represents the lower bound of the information held by firm employees suggests that the 
asymmetry problem may be greater than is revealed in our study. Internal information 
asymmetry appears to be an important issue that warrants close attention from firm management. 
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions 
Variable   Definition 
Outlook  The average assessment of business outlook made by current 
employees within 30 days prior to the issuance date of management 
forecast. We code “getting better” as 1, “staying the same” as 0, and 
“getting worse” as -1. Data source: Glassdoor 
MFE   Management forecast error, measured as the actual earnings per share 
for year t+1 minus management earnings forecast for year t+1, scaled 
by the closing price at the end of year t. Data source: I/B/E/S Guidance  
LogMVE  The natural logarithm of market value of equity (prcc_f*csho). Data 
source: Compustat 
MTB   Market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity (ceq). Data source: Compustat 
LEV  Leverage ratio, calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets 
(dltt/at). Data source: Compustat 
ROA   Return on asset, measured as income before extraordinary items (ib) 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the quarter (at). Data source: 
Compustat 
SalesGrowth  Sales growth, measured as sales in year t minus sales in year t-1, 
divided by sales in year t-1. Data source: Compustat 
Loss  An indicator variable equal to one if earnings before extraordinary 
items are negative (ib), and zero otherwise. Data source: Compustat 
TACC  Total accruals, measured as the difference between earnings (ib) and 
operating cash flows (oancf-xidoc), scaled by beginning total assets 
(ib). Data source: Compustat 
RET  Cumulative stock return over the fiscal year t. Data source: CRSP 
StdROA  Standard deviation of return on assets during the past five years. Data 
source: Compustat 
StdRET  Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year t. Data 
source: CRSP 
LitiRisk  Litigation risk, measured as an indicator variable equal to one for 
litigious industries including Bio-Technology (SIC 2833 to 2836), 
Computer Hardware (SIC 3570 to 3577), Electronics (SIC 3600 to 
3674), Retailing (SIC 5200 to 5961), and Computer Software (SIC 
7370 to 7374), and zero otherwise. Data source: Compustat 
LogNUMA  The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the 
company. Data source: I/B/E/S 
Horizon  Management forecast horizon, measured as the difference between 
fiscal year end of forecasting year and forecast issuance date, scaled by 
365. Data source: I/B/E/S Guidance 
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Variables used in cross-sectional analysis 
Founder_CEO  An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is a founder of the 
company, zero otherwise. Data source: 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2018/04/FoundingDates.pdf 
and ExecuComp 
CEO_Tenure  An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO tenure is above sample 
median, zero otherwise. CEO tenure is measured as the number of years 
the CEO has worked in the company. Data source: ExecuComp 
ExternalOriented_CEO  An indicator variable equal to one if the number of investor conferences 
the CEO attends is above sample median, and zero otherwise. Data 
source: Bloomberg Corporate Events Database. 
SeniorMgmt_D  An indicator variable equal to one if the average of the reviewers’ five-
point scale ratings on senior management is above sample median, zero 
otherwise. Data source: Glassdoor 
Culture_D  An indicator variable equal to one if the average of the reviewers’ five-
point scale ratings on firm culture and value is above sample median, 
zero otherwise. Data source: Glassdoor 
Compensation_D  An indicator variable equal to one if the average of the reviewers’ five-
point scale ratings on compensation and benefits is above sample 
median, zero otherwise. Data source: Glassdoor 
CareerOppor_D  An indicator variable equal to one if the average of the reviewers’ five-
point scale ratings on career opportunities is above sample median, zero 
otherwise. Data source: Glassdoor 
SatisfFactor  An indicator variable equal to one if the factor calculated based on 
senior management, culture &value, compensation & benefits, and 
career opportunities is above sample median, and zero otherwise. Data 
source: Glassdoor 
Decentralization  An indicator variable equal to one if the firm decentralization score is 
above the median, zero otherwise. The decentralization score is 
computed as the first factor of principal component analysis based on 
the number of business segments, the number of geographic segments, 
and the number of employees. Data source: Compustat 
IC_Weakness  An indicator variable equal to one if the firm discloses an internal 
control weakness, zero otherwise. Data source: AuditAnalytics 
EmpStockOption  An indicator variable equal to one if the number of rank-and-file 
employee stock option is above sample median, and zero otherwise. 
Rank-and-file employee stock option is calculated as total employee 
stock options minus stock options owned by top executives, scaled by 
the number of shares outstanding. Data source: Compustat and 
ExecuComp 
Variables used in managerial incentive and insider trading analysis 
Financial Distress   Altman’s Z score, computed as (1.2 × working capital/total assets + 1.4 
× retained earnings/total assets + 3.3 × operating income/total assets + 
0.6 × market value of equity/total liabilities + sales/total assets). Data 
source: Compustat 
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External Financing  The sum of equity and debt financing scaled by lagged total assets, 
where equity financing equals cash proceeds from the sale of common 
and preferred stock minus cash payments for the purchase of common 
and preferred stock and cash payments for dividends, and net debt 
issuance equals cash proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt 
minus cash payments for long-term debt reductions and the net changes 
in current debt. Data source: Compustat 
Industry Concentration   Industry concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms’ 
sales within each four-digit SIC industry. Data source: Compustat 
Insider Selling  Net abnormal sales made by CEOs and CFOs, measured as the number 
of net sales (i.e., number of shares sold minus number of shares 
purchased) made during the 30-day period following the management 
earnings forecast date, minus the number of net sales made during the 
90-day period before management earnings forecast date, scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding. Data source: Thomson Financial  
Purchase_Indicator  An indicator variable equal to one if CEO or CFO made any open 
market purchase in the 30 days following the issuance of management 
forecast date. Data source: Thomson Financial 
Purchase_Quantity  Abnormal number of shares purchased by CEO and CFO, measured as 
the difference between shares purchased in the 30 days after the 
forecast issuance date and shares purchased in the 90 days before the 
issuance date, scaled by the number shares outstanding. Data source: 
Thomson Financial 
Variables used in future performance and turnover analysis 
LargeGap  Disagreement between management forecasts and employee outlook, 
measured as an indicator variable equal to one if management forecast 
error is in the most optimistic (pessimistic) quintile and employee 
outlook is in the most pessimistic (optimistic) quintile in any of the past 
three years, zero otherwise. Data source:  I/B/E/S Guidance and 
Glassdoor  
TobinQ  Market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Data source:  
Compustat 
Tangible  Net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by beginning assets. Data 
source:  Compustat 
R&D  Research and development expense (xrd), scaled by beginning sales 
Data source:  Compustat 
InstOwn  Institutional ownership, measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors. Data source: Thomson Financial 
AbsMFE  Absolute value of management forecast error, measured as the actual 
earnings per share minus the first annual earnings forecast made during 
the forecasting year, scaled by stock price. Data source: I/B/E/S 
Guidance 
CEO_Turnover  An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO experiences a turnover in 
the fiscal year. Data source: Thomson Financial 
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EmpOverallSatisf  Employee overall satisfaction, measured by the five-point scale overall 
ratings provided by current employee reviewers. Data source: 
Glassdoor 
ROE  Return on equity, measured as earnings before extraordinary items (ib) 
scaled by equity (ceq). Data source: Compustat 
CAR  Cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return in a fiscal year. Data 
source: CRSP 
LogSales  The natural logarithm of sales. Data source: Compustat 
Age65  An indicator variable equal to one if the age of the CEO is over 65, zero 
otherwise. Data source: ExecuComp 
CEO_Ownership  The number of stocks owned by CEO, scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding. Data source: ExecuComp 
CEOChair_Durality  An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also a chairman of the 
board, zero otherwise. Data source: ExecuComp 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean STD P25 Median P75 
MFE 11,686 0.0010 0.0103 0.0000 0.0015 0.0041 
Outlook 11,686 0.3084 0.5627 0.0000 0.3333 0.8000 
LogMVE 11,686 8.6779 1.5192 7.6014 8.6592 9.7500 
MTB 11,686 4.7495 7.8155 1.9093 3.0567 5.1210 
LEV 11,686 0.2346 0.1695 0.1027 0.2276 0.3354 
ROA 11,686 0.0623 0.0728 0.0293 0.0595 0.0956 
SalesGrowth 11,686 0.0750 0.1473 0.0008 0.0516 0.1216 
Loss 11,686 0.0954 0.2938 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TACC 11,686 -0.0574 0.0578 -0.0785 -0.0485 -0.0257 
RET 11,686 0.1676 0.3066 -0.0164 0.1467 0.3191 
StdROA 11,686 0.0366 0.0504 0.0111 0.0207 0.0384 
StdRET 11,686 0.0180 0.0072 0.0130 0.0164 0.0214 
LitiRisk 11,686 0.3691 0.4826 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
LogNUMA 11,686 2.5290 0.6351 2.1972 2.6391 2.9957 
Horizon 11,686 0.5787 0.3455 0.3589 0.5836 0.8438 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our main regression analyses. All 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 2 
 Management Forecast Error and Employee Outlook 
 Dependent Variable: MFEt+1 
                   (1)                   (2)   (3)   
Outlook30 0.0017 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0011 *** 
 (3.46)  (3.48)  (4.78)    
LogMVE   0.0001  0.0003 *   
   (0.76)  (1.66)    
MTB   0.0000  0.0000    
   (0.44)  (1.60)    
LEV   -0.0008  -0.003    
   (0.37)  (1.60)    
ROA   -0.0055 *** -0.0014    
   (2.59)  (0.34)    
SalesGrowth   -0.0027  0.001    
   (1.40)  (0.66)    
Loss   -0.0006  -0.0023 **  
   (0.77)  (2.26)    
TACC   -0.0087 ** -0.0134 *** 
   (2.08)  (3.55)    
RET   0.0015  0.0034 *** 
   (1.57)  (3.58)    
StdROA   0.022 *** 0.0222 *** 
   (5.60)  (4.70)    
StdRET   -0.1134 ** -0.2569 *** 
   (2.12)  (5.22)    
LitiRisk   -0.0001  0.0008    
   (0.09)  (1.03)    
LogNUMA   0.0002  0.0011 **  
   (0.39)  (2.16)    
Horizon   -0.0038 *** -0.0054 *** 
   (4.98)  (6.44)    
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes    Yes  
Observations 11,686  11,686     11,686     
Adjusted R2 0.005   0.05     0.12     
This table presents results from OLS regressions of management forecast errors on employee outlook. 
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects and year fixed 
effects are included. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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TABLE 3  
Management Forecast Error and Employee Outlook – CEO Attribute Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of CEO attributes 
  N Mean STD P25 Median P75 
Founder 5,056 0.1847 0.3881 0 0 0 
Tenure 9,471 7.3680 6.7203 2.6356 5.2521 9.8521 
No. of Conferences 9,202 6.8935 5.1808 3 6 9 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: MFEt+1 
                 (1)                  (2)   (3)   
Outlook 0.0014 *   0.0014 *** 0.0003 *** 
 (1.71)    (3.32)     (2.58)    
Founder_CEO 0.0017      
 (1.39)              
Outlook*Founder_CEO -0.0029 **        
 (2.01)              
CEO_Tenure     0.0001       
      (0.18)          
Outlook*CEO_Tenure      -0.0017 ***      
     (2.97)          
ExternalOriented_CEO    -0.0002    
        (0.63)    
Outlook*ExternalOriented_CEO    0.0006 ***   
        (3.35)    
Controls Yes  Yes    Yes  
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes    Yes  
Observations 5,056  9,471    9,202     
Adjusted R2 0.062  0.065    0.067     
This table examines whether the association between management forecast errors and employee outlook 
varies with CEO attributes. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of CEO attributes. Panel B presents 
the regression results of management forecast errors on employee outlook conditional on CEO attributes. 
Founder_CEO is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is a founder of the company, and zero 
otherwise. CEO_Tenure is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO tenure is above sample median, 
and zero otherwise. ExternalOriented_CEO is an indicator variable equal to one if the number of 
conferences the CEO attends is above sample median, and zero otherwise. All control variables are the 
same as in Table 2, and detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. Fama-French 48 industry fixed 
effects and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, 
respectively.   
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TABLE 4 
Management Forecast Error and Employee Outlook: Employee Satisfaction Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Employee Satisfaction 
 N Mean STD 25th 50th      75th 
SeniorMgmt 11,629 2.9734 0.9938 2.3333 3.0000 3.6667 
Culture 11,629 3.3373 1.0187 2.7857 3.4167 4.0000 
Compensation 11,633 3.3528 0.8792 2.9853 3.4000 4.0000 
CareerOppor 11,631 3.1538 0.9374 2.6000 3.1111 3.8333 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
                                               Dependent Variable: MFEt+1 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Outlook 0.001 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0010 *** 
 (6.05)    (3.82)    (3.76)    (4.89)    (6.42)    
SeniorMgmt_D 0.0007 *       
 (1.88)          
Outlook*SeniorMgmt_D -0.0009 ***       
 (10.15)            
Culture_D   0.0001       
   (0.59)       
Outlook*Culture_D   -0.0005 **          
   (2.04)              
Compensation_D    0.0002 **          
       (2.37)         
Outlook*Compensation_D    -0.0003 **       
       (2.00)      
CareerOpp_D     0.0000    
     (0.03)    
Outlook*CareerOpp_D     -0.0002    
     (1.18)    
SatisfFactor      0.0003  
      (0.85)  
Outlook*SatisfFactor      -0.0007 ** 
      (3.16)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 11,629  11,629  11,633  11,631  11,092     
Adjusted R2 0.054  0.054  0.05  0.051  0.053     
This table examines whether the association between management forecast error and employee outlook 
varies with employee satisfaction. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of employee five-point scale 
satisfaction scores. Panel B presents the regression results of management forecast error on employee 
outlook conditional on employee satisfaction. In Panel B, each employee satisfaction variable (i.e., 
SeniorMgmt_D, Culture_D, Compensation_D, and CareerOpp_D) is an indicator variable equal to one if 
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the corresponding satisfaction score is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. SatisfFactor is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the factor calculated based on principal component analysis of senior 
management; culture and value; compensation and benefits; and career opportunities is above sample 
median, and zero otherwise. All control variables are the same as in Table 2, and detailed variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are 
included. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Management Forecast Error and Employee Outlook: Firm Characteristics Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Firm Characteristics 
 N Mean STD 25th 50th 75th 
No. of Business Segments 8,610 2.5995 1.6291 1 2 4 
No. of Geographic Segments 8,610 3.3976 2.4117 1 3 5 
No. of Employees 8,610 35.766 60.615 5.558 13.500 37.300 
IC_Weakness 11,399 0.0361 0.1864 0 0 0 
RF_StockOption 9,774 0.0360 0.0320 0.0113 0.0300 0.0513 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
                                               Dependent Variable: MFEt+1 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
Outlook 0.0007 * 0.001  0.0011 *** 
 (1.81)    (1.44)    (3.59)    
Decentralization -0.0012 ***   
 (2.64)    
Outlook*Decentralization 0.0004 **    
 (2.22)    
IC_Weakness   -0.0068 ***  
   (2.92)   
Outlook*IC_Weakness  0.0046 *   
      (1.74)   
EmpStockOption       0.0001  
        (0.31)  
Outlook*EmpStockOption    -0.0007 ** 
    (2.43)    
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 8,610  11,399  9,774  
Adjusted R2 0.061  0.031  0.054   
This table examines whether the association between management forecast error and employee outlook 
varies with firm characteristics. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics. Panel B 
presents the regression results of management forecast error on employee outlook conditional on firm 
characteristics. Decentralization is an indicator variable equal to one when the first factor derived from 
principal component analysis based on the number of business segments, geographic segments, and 
employees is above sample median. IC_Weakness is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
discloses an internal control weakness, and zero otherwise. EmpStockOption is an indicator variable equal 
to one when the number of rank-and-file employee stock option is above the sample median. All control 
variables are the same as in Table 2, and detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. Fama-French 
48 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted with 
*, **, and ***, respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
Management Forecast Error and Employee Outlook: Managerial Incentive Analysis 
                                               Dependent Variable: MFEt+1 
 Subsample: 
 
High 
Financial 
Distress 
High 
External 
Financing 
High  
Industry 
Competition 
High  
Insider 
Selling 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Outlook 0.0010 ** 0.0011 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0003 **  
 (2.44)  (4.45)  (2.80)    (1.98)    
Size 0.0005  0.0003  0.0002    0.0000    
 (1.15)  (1.48)  (0.52)    (0.08)    
MTB 0.0000 ** 0.0000  0.0000    0.0000    
 (1.96)  (1.26)  (1.03)    (0.37)    
LEV 0.0012  0.0002  -0.0011    0.001    
 (0.39)  (0.08)  (0.43)    (0.86)    
ROA -0.0165 ** -0.0035  -0.0086 **  -0.0041 **  
 (2.12)  (1.02)  (2.43)    (2.12)    
SG -0.0047 *** -0.0038 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0034 **  
 (3.91)  (2.73)  (4.10)    (2.55)    
Loss 0.0008  0.0002  0.0003    -0.0006    
 (0.49)  (0.11)  (0.22)    (0.88)    
TACC 0.0104  -0.0016  0.0031    -0.0008    
 (1.03)  (0.37)  (0.78)    (0.24)    
RET 0.003 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0012    0.0016 **  
 (3.57)  (5.87)  (1.5)    (2.50)    
StdROA 0.025 *** 0.0203 *** 0.024 *** 0.0173 *** 
 (3.36)  (5.12)  (6.00)    (6.97)    
StdRET 0.0595  0.0032  -0.0052    -0.0051    
 (0.79)  (0.07)  (0.13)    (0.24)    
LitiRisk 0.0004  0.0015 ** -0.0001    0.0006    
 (0.44)  (2.44)  (0.07)    (0.92)    
LogNUMA 0.0005  0.0003  0.0002    0.0002    
 (0.61)  (0.60)  (0.42)    (0.35)    
Horizon -0.0037 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0009    -0.0014 *** 
 (3.33)  (2.98)  (0.97)    (2.70)    
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,229  4,854  3,750  5,283  
Adjusted R2 0.111  0.076   0.075   0.063   
This table presents results from OLS regressions of management forecast error on employee outlook 
when employee outlook is positive and managers have incentives to incorporate good news in their 
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forecasts. In Column (1), high financial distress subsample includes observations with Z-score above the 
sample median. In Column (2), high external financing subsample includes observations with firm equity 
and debt issuance above the sample median. In Column (3), high industry competition subsample 
includes observations with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index below the sample median. In Column (4), 
high insider selling subsample includes observations with net insider (i.e., CEO and CFO) selling above 
the sample median. All control variables are the same as in Table 2, and detailed variable definitions are 
in the Appendix. Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
 Insider Trading and Employee Outlook 
 Dependent Variable:  
 
Purchase_ 
Indicator 
Purchase_ 
Quantity 
Purchase_ 
Quantity  
                   (1)                   (2)   (3)   
Outlook -0.0876    0.0001  -0.0005  
 (1.43)    (0.53)  (0.57)  
Size -0.0701    0.0003  0.001  
 (1.61)    (0.88)  (0.59)  
MTB 0.0003    0.0000  -0.0001  
 (0.26)    (1.17)  (1.11)  
LEV 0.1418    0.0004  0.0036  
 (0.80)    (0.45)  (0.87)  
ROA -0.7666    0.0097 * 0.0408 ** 
 (1.58)    (1.93)  (2.46)  
SG -0.2761 *   -0.0016  -0.007  
 (1.77)    (0.69)  (0.78)  
Loss 0.0722    -0.0014  -0.0053 *** 
 (0.45)    (1.08)  (3.55)  
TACC 0.6047    -0.0101 *** -0.0339 ** 
 (1.09)    (3.69)  (2.14)  
RET -0.1513 *** 0.0015  0.0063 ** 
 (2.71)    (1.63)  (2.48)  
StdROA 0.4393    -0.002  -0.0206  
 (0.63)    (0.60)  (1.07)  
StdRET 17.0462 *** 0.0062  0.1042  
 (2.90)    (0.09)  (0.32)  
LitiRisk -0.2512 **  0.0005  0.0021  
 (2.58)    (0.45)  (0.53)  
LogNUMA -0.0796    0.0004  0.0013  
 (0.82)    (0.56)  (0.38)  
Horizon -0.0865 *   0.0008  0.0032  
 (1.76)    (0.93)  (0.84)  
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes    Yes  
Observations 11,248  11,686     5,624     
Adjusted R2 0.089   0.001     0.001     
This table examines the association between insider purchases and employee outlook. In Column (1), the 
dependent variable Purchase_Indicator is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO or CFO made any 
open market purchase in the 30 days following the issuance of management forecast date. In Columns (2) 
and (3), the dependent variable Purchase_Quantity is the abnormal number of shares purchased by the 
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CEO and CFO, measured as the difference between shares purchased in the 30 days after the forecast 
issuance date and shares purchased in the 90 days before the forecast issuance date, scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding. Outlook is the average value of outlook assessments made by current employees 30 
days prior to the forecast issuance date. In Column (2), Purchase_Quantity is coded as zero for 
observations with no trading activities. In Column (3), observations with no trading activities are 
excluded. All control variables are the same as in Table 2, and detailed variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Consequences of Expectation Gaps between Management and Employees:  
Future Performance Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 N Mean STD 25th 50th 75th 
ROA 2,673 0.0506 0.0806 0.0227 0.0515 0.0890 
TobinQ 2,673 2.2574 1.2781 1.3756 1.8268 2.6878 
LargeGap 2,673 0.1620 0.3685 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Size 2,673 8.3075 1.5193 7.2068 8.2104 9.3362 
LEV 2,673 0.2181 0.1688 0.0824 0.2047 0.3143 
SalesGrowth 2,673 0.0766 0.1220 0.0056 0.0559 0.1266 
Tangible 2,673 0.2191 0.2055 0.0712 0.1425 0.2942 
R&D 2,673 0.0270 0.0465 0.0000 0.0019 0.0338 
StdRet 2,673 0.0192 0.0072 0.0140 0.0177 0.0230 
InstOwn 2,673 0.7085 0.1660 0.6106 0.7355 0.8228 
AbsMFE 2,673 0.0083 0.0145 0.0022 0.0042 0.0083 
EmpOverallSatisf 2,673 3.2916 0.7312 2.8810 3.3333 3.7647 
Outlook 2,673 0.2699 0.4366 0.0000 0.2861 0.5542 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
                                               Dependent Variable:  
 ROAt       TobinQt ROAt  TobinQt  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
LargeGapt-3,t-1 -0.0084 * -0.2422 *** -0.0081 * -0.2305 *** 
 (1.83)  (3.27)  (1.79)  (3.08)    
Size 0.0041 *** 0.0775 ** 0.0041 *** 0.0789 **  
 (3.25)  (2.35)  (3.27)  (2.39)    
LEV 0.007  0.3218  0.0072  0.3346    
 (0.76)  (1.34)  (0.80)  (1.39)    
ROA 0.6862 *** 6.5833 *** 0.6833 *** 6.4544 *** 
 (23.13)  (8.58)  (23.01)  (8.34)    
SalesGrowth -0.0073  1.3994 *** -0.0101  1.2706 *** 
 (0.49)  (4.75)  (0.66)  (4.32)    
Tangible 0.0142  0.3331  0.0136  0.3036    
 (1.53)  (1.39)  (1.44)  (1.25)    
R&D 0.0122  12.4798 *** 0.0095  12.3563 *** 
 (0.22)  (8.37)  (0.17)  (8.36)    
StdRET -1.1792 *** 5.9556  -1.1623 *** 6.7117    
 (3.32)  (0.85)  (3.26)  (0.96)    
InstOwn 0.0015  0.1027  0.0011  0.0819    
 (0.16)  (0.46)  (0.11)  (0.37)    
AbsMFE 0.1356  -4.7611 ** 0.1347  -4.8000 **  
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 (0.90)  (2.46)  (0.90)  (2.45)    
EmpOverallSatisf 0.0034 * 0.1777 *** 0.0015  0.0935 *   
 (1.75)  (3.96)  (0.58)  (1.68)    
Outlook    0.0048  0.2155 **  
    (1.07)  (2.44) 
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,673  2,673  2,673  2,673  
Adjusted R2 0.522  0.433  0.522  0.435   
This table examines the association between the expectation gap between management and employees 
and firm future performance. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of all variables. Panel B presents 
results from OLS regressions of firm future performance on the expectation gap. ROA is the return on 
assets in the current year. TobinQ is Tobin’s Q in the current year. LargeGap is an indicator variable 
equal to one if management forecast error is in the most optimistic (pessimistic) quintile and employee 
outlook is in the most pessimistic (optimistic) quintile in any of the past three years, and zero otherwise. 
All control variables are calculated as the average over the past three years. Detailed variable definitions 
are in the Appendix. Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Consequences of Expectation Gaps between Management and Employees:  
CEO Turnover Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
       N     Mean      STD      25th    50th 75th 
CEO_Turnover 1,561 0.1044 0.3059 0 0 0 
LargeGap 1,561 0.1585 0.3653 0 0 0 
ROE 1,561 0.0502 0.0493 0.0402 0.0556 0.0700 
CAR 1,561 0.0522 0.1617 -0.0437 0.0400 0.1376 
LogSales 1,561 8.2253 1.4604 7.2462 8.1990 9.2301 
StdROA 1,561 0.0344 0.0388 0.0125 0.0214 0.0396 
StdRet 1,561 0.0176 0.0061 0.0131 0.0165 0.0208 
InstOwn 1,561 0.7234 0.1519 0.6304 0.7441 0.8256 
AbsMFE 1,561 0.0079 0.0138 0.0022 0.0040 0.0083 
Age 1,561 56.3822 6.5172 52 56 60 
Age65 1,561 0.0909 0.2876 0 0 0 
Tenure 1,561 7.3680 6.7203 2.6356 5.2521 9.8520 
CEO_Ownership 1,561 0.0138 0.0354 0.0008 0.0024 0.0076 
CEOChair_Duality 1,561 0.5608 0.4964 0 1 1 
EmpOverallSatisf 1,561 3.2660 0.7761 2.8333 3.3333 3.7736 
Outlook 1,561 0.2379 0.4636 0 0.2564 0.5338 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
                                               Dependent Variable: CEO_Turnovert 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
LargeGapt-3, t-1 0.4208 ** 0.5092 ** 0.4329 ** 0.4365 *** 
 (2.07)  (2.38)  (2.00)  (2.03)     
ROE -3.6065 ** -4.0334 *** -3.8825 *** -3.9406 *** 
 (2.39)  (2.80)  (2.73)  (2.74)    
CAR -1.8301 *** -1.9159 *** -1.9035 *** -1.9229 *** 
 (3.03)  (2.89)  (2.86)  (2.80)    
LogSales 0.0622  0.0617  0.0798  0.0813    
 (0.94)  (0.87)  (1.14)  (1.15)    
StdROA 4.07 * 4.611 * 4.9247 ** 4.8839 **  
 (1.91)  (1.81)  (2.03)  (2.04)    
StdRET -4.0479  12.7947  10.0446  10.1881    
 (0.22)  (0.66)  (0.51)  (0.52)    
InstOwn 0.4329  0.224  0.3091  0.3057    
 (0.75)  (0.37)  (0.52)  (0.52)    
AbsMFE 2.0259  -3.4375  -3.3444  -3.2837    
 (0.32)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.49)    
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CEOAge   0.0537 *** 0.052 *** 0.0522 *** 
   (3.34)  (3.19)  (3.21)    
CEOAge65   0.68 *** 0.7206 *** 0.721 *** 
   (2.68)  (2.85)  (2.85)    
Tenure   0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 
   (3.27)  (3.34)  (3.34)    
CEO_Ownership   -13.0557 *** -12.9732 ** -12.9637 **  
   (2.65)  (2.50)  (2.50)    
CEOChair_Duality   -0.0963  -0.0957  -0.0975    
   (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.50)    
EmpOverallSatisf    -0.2928 *** -0.3142 **  
    (2.82)  (2.21)    
Outlook     0.0538    
     (0.22)    
Industry/Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,561  1,561  1,561  1,561  
Adjusted R2 0.065  0.109  0.114  0.114   
This table examines the association between the expectation gap between management and employees 
and future CEO turnover. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of all variables. Panel B presents results 
from logit regressions of CEO turnover on expectation gap between management and employees. 
CEO_Turnover is an indicator equal to one if the firm experiences a CEO turnover in the current year, 
and zero otherwise. LargeGap is an indicator variable equal to one if management forecast error is in the 
most optimistic (pessimistic) quintile and employee outlook is in the most pessimistic (optimistic) quintile 
in any of the past three years, and zero otherwise. All control variables are calculated as the average over 
the past three years, except that CEOChair_Duality and CEOAge65 are equal to one if they take the value 
of one in any of the past three years. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. Fama-French 48 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
